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1. There is a way of thinking about epistemic justification 
that holds that it dwells solely in beliefs. According to this 
view, any relation between what is believed and any item 
different from beliefs – maybe even if it is an item that 
could be a belief – is at most a causal relation. This view, 
commonly associated to Davidson's take on coherentism, 
can be stimulated by some of Wittgenstein's remarks 
concerning the irrelevance of interpretations when we 
follow rules (1953).  
This view on justification can make one feel challenged 
to explain how the contents of our beliefs relate to the 
world; how, for instance, they acquire their empirical sig-
nificance. At first sight, beliefs could either have their 
content acquired through a merely causal interaction with 
relevant items of the world or could be left so that their 
content is not hooked to any item of the world other than 
beliefs. The former is the route that Quine often seemed to 
have favored as he assumed experience could be de-
scribed in terms of stimuli in our nerve endings. The latter 
would amount to an image – with a distinguishable David-
sonian flavour to it – where states with content are some-
how confined out of the reach of nature. If we want to 
gloss this last alternative in a Kantian framework, we can 
say that judgments are taken to be composed by assem-
bling concepts that are themselves disconnected to intui-
tions, and therefore are empty – they could be at most 
formally valid. The world gets lost. It follows from all this 
that if justification is an affair of beliefs we can either hope 
to get an (intentional) connection to the world through 
causal relations or give up such connection altogether. 
In what follows I try to examine several questions around 
this issue in order to point at how our conception of nature 
matters for how we think of justification. I start out consid-
ering the ways in which we can make either of those two 
alternatives tolerable; this will lead me to question of what 
could be behind this apparent dilemma. This will then lead 
me to deal directly with the influence our thinking about 
nature makes on how we conceive of justification. 
2. The idea that causes can provide content to our beliefs 
depends on the assumption that our senses – or our 
nerve-ending stimuli – relate causally to elements of our 
thought. The connection would provide content if it enables 
us to point at a reliable correlation. Davidson, among 
others, has challenged the idea by pointing out that causal 
connections could fail to be describable in terms of natural 
laws (1970). In fact, Davidson's rejection of a scheme-
content dualism (1974) can be seen as entailing a rejec-
tion of the idea that empirical contents could be in a law-
like relation with anything else. If content always presents 
itself within a conceptual scheme, a law connecting con-
tents and items of the world would have to guide our con-
cept application and therefore this would respond to laws, 
rather than to our rational practices. This consequence of 
the rejection of the scheme-content dualism – or of what 
has been called the Given or, in Kantian terms, exercises 
of receptivity devoid of spontaneity – not only shows a 
connection between two theses held by Davidson (i.e. the 
rejection of the dualism and the resistance to psycho-
physical laws) but also makes clear how causal links be-
tween nature and our thinking cannot provide us with 
content. The presence of (rule-guided) concepts in any of 
our empirical contents prevents psychophysical laws even 
though they don't render impossible for contents to be 
causally connected to items of nature.  
If causes cannot provide content from nature to our be-
liefs, we seem to be left with the second, Davidsonian 
alternative: the realm of beliefs is epistemologically and 
intentionally confined. Justification, in this case, happens 
within the realm of beliefs and it is not about anything else. 
There is no intentional link between our thinking and na-
ture; nature only causes some of our states. The idea of 
confinement follows from this conception of nature as 
constituted by a network of causes that cannot reach our 
thinking. Beliefs make sense only in the context of other 
beliefs and there is no special set of beliefs that would 
bring content to others by relating more closely with the 
rest of the world – the rest of the world is locked out. Since 
there is no belief that could be somehow closer to the rest 
of the world, there is little room for us to consider that 
some among our beliefs could be foundational. Hence, if 
the skeptic challenges the belief that I'm not a brain in a 
vat, there is nothing else that she is challenging – I can 
concede to be a brain in a vat and carry on holding my 
beliefs involving trees, tables and people. No doubting of a 
subset of my beliefs would force me to doubt all my beliefs. 
The skeptic is therefore exorcised as there is no strategy 
open to her other than carefully putting in question each of 
our beliefs. Such strategy for global doubt will in turn fail 
since in order to question some of beliefs she would have 
to hold, at least provisionally, some others. The cost of 
exorcising the skeptic, however, is high: we loose contact 
with nature and make a mystery out of our capacity to think 
about it. The sense of confinement follows not from our 
thinking not reaching anything other than thinkable con-
tents but rather from a conception of nature according to 
which it stands outside our reach. Confinement makes 
justification belief-bound and beliefs indifferent to nature. 
3. McDowell (1994) attempted to see a way out of this 
confinement by rethinking our notions of experience and 
nature. He insisted that nature, conceived as a realm of 
causal connections, and experience, understood as be-
longing to nature, could not provide us with justifications 
for our thoughts; they could at most provide us at most 
with exculpations. We can only rid ourselves from blame 
for what we think by pointing at items of the world. 
It seems, however, that although exculpations fall short 
of constituting full-blown justifications they do play an 
intentional role. McCulloch (2002) claims that we don't 
need epistemological relations between thoughts and 
nature to assure us that the contents of our thoughts come 
from nature: exculpations could be enough. I suspect that 
if Wittgenstein is right about the way we follow rules, there 
could not be something like exculpations from nature for 
these would be already clues upon which we could build 
up interpretations. If I blame nature for my thinking of the 
tree in front of me – even though I don't assume my belief 
is justified merely by pointing at the tree – I could next 
present an interpretation of the rules of application of the 
concept of tree that would suffice to guide the application 




of the concept. In fact, I can only exculpate myself for what 
I think if I can point at something in the form of L: 
(L) I think of a tree because there is a tree in front of me 
and whenever there is a tree in front of me (and a set of 
additional conditions hold) I think of a tree (maybe be-
cause anyone would). 
I believe the argument above against psychophysical laws 
prevent not only causes acting as justifications but also as 
exculpations.  
McDowell's position, however, can be still tempting. He 
claims that whatever causal connections could give us is 
not enough for our thinking to be rationally controlled by 
the world. If we are worried with constraints from what 
Kant called receptivity, we are likely to crave for a connec-
tion between our thinking and the world that is stronger 
than whatever causes can offer. McDowell labors to make 
intelligible the idea that in experience we open ourselves 
to the world. He holds that we gain conceptual content 
through exercises of receptivity. In order for conceptual 
content to be obtained from experience, nature itself has to 
be able to provide this content – McDowell then suggests 
on the need for a partial re-enchantment of nature where 
concepts and meanings as well as laws can be taken as 
natural. Re-enchantment, of course, is a remedy against 
the dualism of reason and nature and therefore alleviates 
the feeling of confinement by viewing us as capable to 
reach nature and be influenced by it in our own conceptual 
exercises. Nature is not something that is oblivious to the 
way we access it; quite the contrary, it can reveal itself 
only to those who have gone through a conceptual 
Bildung.  
One could then ask how we should face causal connec-
tions within nature. The worry would plausibly show up, for 
example, when we look at law-like descriptions of our 
cognitive activities; it seems reasonable to suppose that 
laws can describe at least the mechanisms that enable our 
thinking practices. In Bensusan (2000) I presented a 
model where the laws governing these mechanisms are 
not only (at most) a starting point for a process of scrutiny 
and revision but also themselves subject to scrutiny and 
revision. McDowell, for example in his 1996, favors a 
model of second nature that he reads in Aristotle's virtue 
ethics. He takes a natural law to be incapable to rationally 
compel us to any action or thinking: it cannot produce a 
rational obligation. It has therefore to be somehow brought 
to the space of reasons in order to make a difference to 
our contents. When they are brought to the space of rea-
sons, we can rationally relate to them and they become 
part of our second nature. The emerging image of nature 
is one where there are both first and second nature but we 
live within the scope of second nature.1 Experience can 
therefore be described as (second) natural. Experience 
and nature are then rethought; we can gain contact with 
natural items that do not need to be devoid of anything that 
resembles concepts and thinkable contents to be objec-
tive. 
Re-enchantment, however, could still sound like not 
much more than a vague idea. How exactly, we can ask, 
are we to put together first and second nature, conceptual 
judgments – of which we have experience – and causes? 
Bensusan & Pinedo Garcia (2003) have recommended the 
notion of soft facts to ground our conception of the objects 
of our knowledge and thought. In a world that is both ob-
                                                     
1 McDowell insists in calling himself a naturalist––adding quickly that he holds 
a naturalism of second nature. He resists any idea that could lead to some 
form of dualism where nature is not all. His position contrasts with a more 
Hegelian one that would understand nature as what we depart from through 
the achievements of spirit.  
jective and thinkable, there is room for natural laws as they 
can be content of our thought. But we are encouraged to 
take a somehow Humean approach to causes and see 
them as no more than what is expressed in laws instead of 
some sort of hard fact that would constitute the bedrock of 
what is natural. Causes would then be understood only 
within our understanding of laws and those would depend 
on our understanding without which we could not use them 
either to predict or explain anything.2 If we give up the 
primacy of causes over our concepts and practices, we 
can accommodate them in nature and yet feel no urge to 
describe everything else in causal terms. 
4. Michael Williams (1996) takes McDowell's re-enchant-
ment of nature to be a sophisticated form of foundational-
ism. He takes McDowell's recipe against confinement to be 
a change in our image of nature so that experience could 
be a conceptual contact with thinkable objects and there-
fore provide a foundation for our world view. The basic 
structure of foundationalism concerning epistemic justifica-
tion is preserved. In fact, some thinkable contents act as 
products of passive exercise of conceptual capacities and 
are the ones that give empirical support to our judgments. 
Furthermore, some beliefs are central to our intentional 
connection to the world; some beliefs – like the presence 
of objects to our thinking – glue the world to our judg-
ments. Because of these somehow privileged beliefs, the 
Davidsonian strategy against the skeptic vat brain argu-
ment would not hold. Justification – and empirical content 
– is thought as coming from a privileged source and ulti-
mately from how things are. A revised conception of nature 
enables us to make sense of justification as being some-
thing other than merely an affair of beliefs: a source of 
justification is brought from nature through experience. 
Williams’ point is that McDowell’s way out of confinement 
seems to involve being grounded by nature, with a revised 
notion of nature. 
His revision in the notion of nature shows how much the 
way we think of justification and its relation to the world 
bears on how we take nature to be. McDowell’s re-en-
chantment of nature intends to make experience capable 
to ground our empirical thinking. However, the emerging 
conception of nature – where it is not only a network of 
causes – could perhaps be assimilated to an architecture 
of justification less suspicious of foundationalism. We can 
find our way out of a belief confinement if we exorcise the 
idea that our reasons are surrounded by (unintelligible) 
causes; if thinkable contents are not strangers in a world of 
causes and justification can be thoroughly world-involving 
without appealing to a grounding experience. But if we 
want to hold on to a re-enchanted conception of nature 
while rejecting the remnants of foundationalism we will 
also need to add a perhaps less palatable qualification. 
We would have to accept that our justifications would not 
themselves depend on our conception of nature for if they 
did, a challenge to the conception would make our justifi-
cations collapse. Notice that this does not happen in 
Davidson’s account: if nature turns out to be more than 
mere causes, most of our beliefs would still hold. Making 
that less palatable qualification makes our conception of 
justification less safe against the feeling of confinement. 
We can then feel compelled to conclude that a conception 
of nature that views it always from the point of view of our 
beliefs is maybe always on the brink of making us feel 
confined. Perhaps, then, we just have to make sure at all 
times that the world doesn’t get lost. 
                                                     
2 Lack of space prevents a complete treatment of causal relations in these 
terms but I will briefly mention something that is sketched in Bensusan & 
Pinedo Garcia (2003). We could face laws as rules that could be grasped and 
used for prediction and explanation within our understanding practices.  
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